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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction over this appeal is conferred upon the Court of
Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann, § 78-2a-3(d) (1994), providing
for appellate jurisdiction by the Court of Appeals over appeals
from the circuit courts.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues before this Court are 1) whether the Circuit
Court abused its discretion by entering the judgment by default
pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C) against defendants for
failure to respond to discovery; and 2) whether the circuit
court's refusal to set aside the judgment pursuant to Rule
60(b)(1) was an abuse of discretion.
Standard of Review;

The Court reviews both the entry of

default judgment and the refusal to set it aside as to whether
the Circuit Court abused its discretion.

Arnica Mutual Insurance

Co. v. Shettler. 768 P.2d 950, 961 (Utah App. 1989); Tucker
Realty v. Nunlev. 396 P.2d 410, 412.
Appellant must clearly show an abuse of discretion; it is
not enough to show that some basis may exist to set aside the
default.

Utah Dept. of Transportation v. Osquthorpe, 259 Adv.

Rep. 36, 39 (Utah 1994); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah
1986).
DETERMINATIVE LAW
The following statutes which bear on the resolution of the
issues presented are reproduced in Addendum A to this brief:
Utah R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(c)
1

Utah R. Civ. P. 55
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1), (7)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

Defendants appeal a default judgment in favor of plaintiff
Michael A. Mower entered August 25, 1994 (R. at 189-90), and from
an order denying defendant's motion to set aside the judgment
dated September 22, 1994 (R. at 234-36), of the Third Circuit
Court of Salt Lake County, Salt Lake City Division, the Honorable
Sheila K. McCleve presiding.

A copy of the circuit court's

orders are attached in Addendum B to this Brief.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below

The plaintiff Michael Mower initially filed this action on
August 13, 1993 seeking to foreclose a mechanics lien on the
residence of defendant James A. Craghead (defendant Craghead) for
materials and labor provided to the residence for the benefit of
defendant Craghead (R. at 1-6).

Plaintiff filed an Amended

Complaint on January 24, 1994, stating causes of action for
breach of contract and quantum meruit against defendant Craghead
and against defendant Lynn Padan, Inc. (defendant Padan), general
contractor for the remodeling of the Craghead residence.

(R. at

7-13.)
On March 28, 1994, plaintiff served defendants by mail,
through counsel, with Plaintiff's First Request for Production of
Documents to Defendants James D. Craghead and F. Lynn Padan, and

2

Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories to Defendants James D.
Craghead and F. Lynn Padan.

(R. at 48.)

On May 10, 1994, ten days after defendants1 responses to
discovery were due, plaintiff's counsel sent a letter to defendants' counsel reminding him defendants' responses were past due,
(R. at 73.)

On May 17, 1994, receiving no response, plaintiff

filed his first Motion to Compel Discovery.
104.)

Defendants did not respond.

(R. at 49-73; 80-

On June 9, 1994, 40 days

after defendant's responses to discovery were due, the circuit
court entered an order giving defendants ten days within which to
answer the discovery, and awarding to plaintiff costs and fees
incurred in bringing the motion.

(R. at 78-79).

On June 17, 1994, within the ten days required by the Court,
defendants filed a certificate of service with the Court, and
provided limited and incomplete responses to the interrogatories.
No documents were provided.

(R. at 105-106.)

On June 21, 1994,

plaintiff's counsel wrote a letter to defendants' counsel requesting that documents be delivered before the deposition of
defendant Padan scheduled for June 24, 1994.

The letter also

informed defendants that their answers to the interrogatories
were inadequate, and stated why plaintiff felt entitled to more
complete responses.

(R. at 139.)

On June 24, 1994, as agreed by the parties through counsel
in an earlier telephone call, counsel for plaintiff filed a
notice continuing the deposition of defendant Padan in order to
give defendants until July 5, 1994 to produce documents.
3

(R. at

107.)

Defendants failed to produce the documents as agreed.

On

July 7, 1994, 68 days after defendants1 responses to discovery
were due, plaintiff filed his second motion to compel, along with
supporting memorandum.

(R. at 109-139.)

Again, defendants did not respond.

Although defendant Padan

produced a few documents at his deposition on July 8, 1994, he
did not produce all requested documents, and had still failed to
answer the interrogatories.

Defendant Craghead did not produce

any discovery, or respond in any way to plaintiff's motion.
On July 20, 1994, 81 days after defendants1 responses to
discovery were due, plaintiff mailed a copy of a Notice to Submit
for Decision on his motion to compel, and mailed a copy of the
notice to defendants1 counsel on July 20, 1994, which was filed
with the circuit court on July 22, 1994.

(R. at 140-141).

On

July 26, 1994, in a summary disposition, the circuit court
granted plaintiff's motion and awarded attorneys1 fees.

The

circuit court, in its minute entry, also ordered defendants to
respond within 2 0 days or their answer would be stricken and a
default judgment entered against them.

(R. at 142.)

On August 2, 1994, 93 days after defendants' responses to
plaintiff's discovery were due, plaintiff's counsel mailed to
defendants' counsel a copy of a proposed order reflecting the
circuit court's decision.

The order states in relevant part:

Plaintiff's Motion to Compel is granted. Defendants
are to provide their response to plaintiff's discovery
within 2 0 days or defendants' answer will be deemed
stricken and judgment entered.

4

(R. at 148.)

The language contained in the order is almost

identical to the minute entry of July 26, 1994, which states:
Attnys fees awarded/defendants respond w/in 2 0 days or
answer stricken and judgment entered.
(R. at 142.)
On August 4, 1994, the circuit court entered the order,
granting plaintiff's motion to compel and awarding fees, and
ordering defendants to respond within 2 0 days or their Answers to
plaintiff's Complaint would be stricken.

(R. at 143-49.)

On

August 9, 1994, 100 days after their responses were due, defendants filed a motion objecting to the order.
er, still did not respond to the discovery

Defendants, howev(R. at 150-165.)

On August 19, 1994, ten days after defendants' objection to
the order was filed, 2 3 days following the circuit court's minute
entry, and following defendants1 continued noncompliance with the
court's order, plaintiff filed a responsive motion, seeking entry
of judgment.

(R. at 167-186).

On August 24, 1994, 28 days after

the minute entry, and 2 0 days after the entry of the order,
defendants had still not complied with the court's order.

On

August 25, 1994, 149 days after the discovery was served, and 116
days after responses were due, the circuit court entered Judgment
against defendants, striking defendants' answer, dismissing their
counterclaim, and awarding plaintiff the amount of his lien, and
his costs and fees.

(R. at 187-191.)

On August 29, 1994, defendants' filed a motion to set aside
the default.

On September 9, 1994, defendants' filed a supple-

mental memorandum in support of their motion and a Notice to
5

Submit for Decision.

(R. at 207-213.)

The circuit court denied

the motion in a minute entry dated September 12, 1994, which was
formalized in an order filed September 23, 1994.
234-366.)
Appeal.

(R. at 231,

On October 12, 1994, defendants filed their Notice of
(R. at 237-238.)
C

Statement of Facts

As provided by Rule 24(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, plaintiff does not repeat the statement of facts
offered by defendants.

Plaintiff disputes the alleged burglary

was the reason for defendants1 failure to respond to discovery
and comply with the circuit court's orders.

Some additional

facts contained in the record, are offered for consideration in
resolving this appeal:
1.

Defendants1 own counsel admits his clients1 failure to

comply with discovery was due to their failure to cooperate with
their counsel.
2.

(App. Br. at 6., n.4.)

The alleged burglary claimed by defendants as making

response impossible took place well after the time defendants
were required to respond, and after one motion to compel had been
granted and a second motion filed.
3.

(R. at 164.)

There is no evidence in the record that the burglary

was a reason for defendant Padan's failure to produce documents
not on a computer disc, for defendant Craghead's failure to
provide any documents, or for both defendants failure to answer
interrogatories.

6

4.

Defendants called plaintiff's counsel on July 26, 1994,

allegedly to notify her of the burglary.

When plaintiff returned

defendant Padan1s call, however, defendant Padan was unavailable.
Despite the fact that plaintiff's counsel left a message, defendant Padan did not try to contact plaintiff's counsel again.
at 163.)

(R.

Neither plaintiff or his counsel was notified of the

burglary until August 4, 1994, over a week after the minute entry
giving defendants twenty days to respond to discovery.

(R. at

158.)
5.

On August 4, 1994, on first learning of the burglary,

plaintiff's counsel wrote defendants' counsel, asking for a list
of documents believed stolen.
spond .
6.

Defendants' counsel did not re-

Add. C.
No evidence or argument was introduced at the trial

court level respecting the action referred to in defendants'
brief, Martin Bennett v. James Craghead, Aspen Construction,
Michael A. Mower, et al, Civil No. 930904047CV.

Furthermore,

that action was decided by a default judgment based on pro se
plaintiff Bennett's failure to respond to the Motion to Dismiss
filed by Lynn Padan, aka Aspen Construction.

Mower was a co-

defendant with Craghead and Padan in that matter, and there is no
order barring Bennett from collecting from Mower the value of the
materials and labor provided as subcontractor for Mower, or
releasing Mower from his obligation to Bennett, or releasing
defendants Craghead and Padan from their obligations to codefendant Mower.
7

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
A trial court has discretion, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P.
37(b)(2)(C), to render a judgment by default against a party who
fails to comply with discovery.

Rule 55 Utah R. of Civ. P.

provides a party seeking to set aside a default judgment must do
so pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b).

It is then within the

discretion of the trial court whether or not to grant the motion.
A denial of a motion to set aside a default judgment will not be
disturbed, even if there were some basis on which a default judgment could have been set aside, unless defendants can clearly
prove an abuse of discretion.
The record shows defendants were granted numerous opportunities to respond to discovery, including extensions of time and
two motions to compel.

Defendants1 failure to respond to discov-

ery in this case was due to their own negligence, their failure
to cooperate with their counsel, and their disregard of the
judicial process.

The record contains sufficient evidence to

demonstrate that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion
in entering a default judgment against defendants for their
failure to respond
Nor did the circuit court abuse its discretion in denying
defendants1 motion to set aside the default pursuant to Utah R.
Civ P. 60(b).

The evidence contained in the record supports the

trial court's rulings.

The record shows the burglary, which

defendants claim made response impossible, took place over two
months after the time defendants were required to respond, and
8

after one motion to compel had been granted and a second motion
filed.

In addition, the record contains no evidence the alleged

burglary kept defendant Padan from providing documents not on the
computer discs allegedly stolen, or was the reason for defendant
Craghead's failure to produce any documents, or kept either of
the defendants from answering interrogatories.
glary only offers a limited justification.

At best, the bur-

Furthermore, there is

no evidence either of the defendants1 attempt to notify plaintiff
of the burglary and make other arrangements concerning discovery
until after the second motion was submitted for decision.
Instead, the record shows a constant disregard and lack of
diligence by defendants to comply with plaintiff's requests and
the court's orders.

Defendants failed to meet their burden of

showing a clear abuse of discretion by the circuit court.

The

entry of judgment in favor of plaintiff should be affirmed, and
plaintiff should be awarded his attorneys' fees and costs on
appeal.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN STRIKING
DEFENDANTS1 ANSWER AND ENTERING DEFAULT JUDGMENT FOR
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH DISCOVERY.
Utah R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2) states in relevant part:
If a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit
discovery...the court in which the action is pending
may make such orders in regard to the failure as are
just, and among others the following:...(C) an order
striking out pleadings or...rendering a judgment by
default against the disobedient party.

(Add. A.)

9

"The entry of default judgment as a sanction based on failure to
fulfill discovery obligations is within the discretion of the
trial court."

Shoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 790 P.2d 584,

585 (Utah App. 1990);
(Utah 1964).

Tucker Realty v. Nunley, 396 P.2d 410, 412

The sanction of default is justified "without

reference to whether the unexcused failure to make discovery was
wilful."

W.W.& W. B. Gardner, Inc. v. Park West Village, Inc.,

568 P.2d 734, 738 (Utah 1977).
A lower court's granting of a default judgment is presumed
to be correct and shall not be disturbed "unless it is shown [the
court's] action is without support in the record, or is a plain
abuse of discretion."

Arnica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Shettler,

768 P.2d at, 961 (Utah App. 1989); Tucker Realty v. Nunlev, 396
at 412.

"That some basis may exist to set aside the default does

not require the conclusion that the court abused its discretion
in refusing to do so when the facts and circumstances support the
refusal."

Utah Dept. of Transportation v. Osguthorpe, 259 Utah

Adv. Rep. 36, 39 (Utah 1995); citing Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92,
93 (Utah 1986).
In Shoney v. Memorial Estates, 790 P.2d 584, 586, this Court
affirmed the district court's granting of a default judgment to
defendants as a sanction against plaintiff for failure to respond
to discovery served on plaintiffs less than two months before,
finding the absence of a motion to compel did not require a
finding of abuse of discretion because there was ample evidence
in the record supporting the court's decision,
10

id. at

586.

In this case, there is also ample evidence in the record to
support the trial court's decision to enter a default judgment.
The defendants in this case were granted even more opportunities
to respond than was the plaintiff in Shoney.

Unlike in Shoney,

defendants in this case had already been served with two motions
to compel the requested discovery, and had been given notice of a
twenty-day time period in which to respond, before judgment was
entered.

Defendants were given an excess of three additional

months to respond to discovery.

Within that time period, defen-

dants were repeatedly reminded by plaintiff's counsel and by the
Court of their obligations.
Furthermore, defendants' own counsel admits that "[b]etween
March 28 and May 17 the defendants' counsel was unable to obtain
his clients' cooperation to adequately respond to the Interrogatories and Request for Documents."

(App. Br. at 6.)

Defendants' counsel also claims he did not file a response
to plaintiff's first motion to compel "due to his clients not
taking time to provide responses."

(App. Br. at 6, n.4.)

The record also reflects that when defendants finally did
file responses, the responses were insufficient, with several
interrogatories left completely unanswered, and with no documents
produced.

The record also shows that, although plaintiff's

counsel agreed to continue the deposition of Padan to allow
defendants more time to produce the documents, defendants still
failed to comply, requiring plaintiff to file a second motion to
compel.

(R. at 113, 111.)
11

The record also shows that defendants did not file any
responsive pleading to either motion to compel.

There is ample

evidence of defendants1 continual failure to comply.

This Court

should affirm the circuit court's decision granting judgment in
favor of plaintiff.
II.

THE COURT'S REFUSAL TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT
WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION; DEFENDANT FAILED TO
MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH R. CIV. P. 60(b).
Defendants also appeal the trial courtfs refusal to set

aside the default judgment.

Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) states in

relevant part:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court
may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or
his legal representative from a final judgment, order,
or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect...or (7)
any other reason justifying relief from the operation
of the judgment.
(Add. A.)
In ruling on a motion to set aside a default judgment
pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b), the trial court is afforded
broad discretion "and its determination will not be disturbed
absent an abuse of discretion."
1117 (Utah App. 1989).

Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114,

The trial court's ruling is such cases

will not be revered by the appellate court "merely because the
motion could have been granted."

State by and Through Div. of

Social Services v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053, 1055 (Utah 1983)
(citations omitted).
On August 4, 1994, over three months after defendants'
responses were due, the circuit court signed an order reflecting
12

it's minute entry of July 26, 1994, granting plaintiff's Motion
to Compel and for fees.

(R at 147-148; Add. B.)

Even though the circuit court had not yet entered a default
judgment, but had only entered an Order granting fees and giving
defendants 20 days to comply, on August 9, 1994, defendants filed
an objection to the Order entered on August 4th pursuant to Utah
R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) and (7), stating that a burglary of defendant
Padan's office on July 13, 1994, made compliance with the order
impossible.

(R. at 150-165.)

The record does not support defendants' assertion that all
compliance was impossible.

Even accepting the burglary prevented

production of documents on computer disks, there is no mention on
the police report that the documents not on a computer disk, such
as architectural plans, defendant Padan's 1992 and 1993 day
planners, and bills, bids and invoices submitted by subcontractors, were stolen.

(R. at 164-165.)

Nor does the alleged

burglary of Padan's office offer an explanation why both Padan
and Craghead failed to complete their answers to the interrogatories, or why Craghead failed to produce any documents.

Defen-

dants had had the discovery for over three months, and had
already been in default for failure to respond for over two
months, before the alleged burglary even took place.

The record

is also void of any adequate explanation for defendants' tardiness in notifying plaintiff of the alleged burglary, for failing

13

to produce to plaintiff's counsel a list of the documents allegedly stolen, or for failing to produce discovery during the
various opportunities allowed by the circuit court.
Apart from burglary, the only other excuse offered by
defendants for their continual failure to respond is the alleged
illness of their counsel.

As with the burglary, however, the

alleged illness of counsel was not until July 20, 1995, almost
three months after the responses were due.

(R. at 155-156.)1

Moreover, defendants1 excuses were considered by the circuit
court, and the circuit court determined these factors to be
insignificant.

Whether the defenses or excuses raised by defen-

dants justified giving defendants even more time than the threemonth extension already given was a decision within the discretion of the circuit court.

It is well settled that it is the

trial judge who is in the best position to make such a determination as whether to set aside a default judgment.

Board of Educa-

tion v. Cox, 384 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah 1963).
In the absence of an abuse of discretion, the Appellate
Court "shpuld not undertake to substitute [its] idea of what is
proper for that of the trial court."

G.M. Leasing Corp. v.

Murray First Thrift and Loan Co, 534 P.2d 1244, 1245 (Utah 1975).
The circuit court could choose not to find the burglary as a
1

The defendants1 delay can best be ascertained by reviewing
the various deadlines and extensions given plaintiff. Discovery
was served March 28, 1994, making responses due on Monday, May 1,
1994 (34 days). The Court's first order compelling discovery
extended the deadline to June 19, 1994. The second order extended the deadline to August 24, 1994, 149 days after the discovery
was mailed.
14

justification for setting aside the default, especially in the
light of defendants' failure to provide sufficient evidence to
excuse their near-total failure to respond.

Defendants have

failed to meet their burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion; the circuit court's entry of judgment in favor of plaintiff
should be affirmed.
III. DEFENDANTS WERE GIVEN NOTICE OF THE TWENTY-DAY TIME
LIMIT TO RESPOND TO DISCOVERY.
On August 24, 1994, the circuit court entered a default
judgment in favor of plaintiff.

Defendants filed a second motion

pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) and (7) seeking to set aside the
default judgment.

(R. at 192-202.)

Again, the record supports

the trial court's refusal to set aside the judgment.
In their motion, defendants claim there was no order prepared concerning the deadline for discovery, in contravention of
Rule 4-504(1) of the Code of Judicial Administration.
contention, however, is contradicted by the record.

This
Both the

circuit court's minute entry and the order clearly and explicitly
refer to the 2 0-day time limitation:
Plaintiff's Motion to Compel granted. Attnys
fees awarded. Defendants respond w/in 2 0
days or answer stricken and judgment entered
(Add. B; R. at 142;)
Plaintiff's Motion to Compel is granted. Defendants
are to respond within 2 0 days or defendants' answer
will be deemed stricken and judgment entered.
(Add. B; R. at 147-148.)

15

IV.

DEPENDANTS1 ARGUMENT ON CLAIM PRECLUSION WAS NOT ARGUED
BELOW, IS NOT CONTAINED IN THE RECORD, AND IS NOT
BEFORE THE COURT.
Defendants1 first motion pursuant to Rule 60(b) seeks to set

aside the default judgment, claiming impossibility due to burglary and excusable neglect due to illness of counsel.

Their

second motion seeks to set aside the judgment on the grounds that
the procedural requirements of Rule 4-501 of the Code of Judicial
Administration were not met.2
Defendants now seek to raise on appeal, a new argument—for
the first time—that a default judgment granted defendant Padan
in a different case in which Mower and defendant Craghead were
co-defendants, bars plaintiff from recovery from defendants in
this case.
Defendants did not raise this issue below and are precluded
from raising it on appeal. Dansie v. Anderson Lumber Co., 878
P.2d 1155 (Utah App. 1994); Rinqwood v. Foreign Autoworks, Inc.,
786 P.2d 1350 (Utah App. 1990); Brobera v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198
(Utah App. 1989).

Nor does the default judgment entered against

the plaintiff of the other case in favor of defendants Craghead
and Padan preclude plaintiff's claims against defendants in this

2

Defendants also argued the Judgment should be set aside
because they fully complied. (R. at 159.) Plaintiff disputed
this. (R. at 216-17.) Furthermore, "a party has a certain
specified time to answer; if he does not, he has failed to
answer, and the opposing party may appropriately invoke the
sanctions." Shoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 790 P.2d at 586
(citations omitted). See also W.W. & W.B. Gardener v. Park W.
Village, 568 P.2d at 737: "once the motions for sanctions has
been filed, the opposing party may not preclude their imposition
by making a belated response...."
16

action before the court.3

Nor are defendants freed from their

legal obligations and liabilities to produce discovery and comply
with the Court's orders in this case.

In addition to being

barred from being considered for not being raised below, defendant's reliance on the other case is without merit, for it simply
has no bearing on plaintiff's rights or defendants' obligations
in this case; the circuit court's granting of judgment in favor
of plaintiff should affirmed.
CONCLUSION
The circuit court's granting of a judgment by default in
favor of plaintiff pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2) against
defendants for their continued failure to comply with discovery
orders is supported by the record and was not an abuse of discretion.

Defendants' failure to respond arose despite the entry of

two orders compelling discovery and the lapse of 149 days between
the serving of the discovery and the order.

The circuit court's

denial of defendants' motions to set aside the judgment pursuant
to Rule 60(b)(1) and (7) is also supported by the record and does
not constitute an abuse of discretion.

3

Claim preclusion only applies if the same issue was litigated on the merits in a previous case that resulted in a final
judgment. State Office of Recovery Services v. V.G.P., 845 P.2d
944 (Utah App. 1992). In the Bennett case, relied on by defendants, the issues on appeal in this case were never litigated;
the court awarded defendants Craghead and Padan default for
plaintiff's failure to file any pleadings after his complaint,
and for failing to respond to defendant Craghead and Padan's
Motion to Dismiss. See also State in Interest of J.J.T., 887
P.2d 161 (Utah App. 1994); Madsen v. Borthick, 789 P.2d 245 (Utah
1988) (issue preclusion is only available if the issue was fully,
fairly and competently litigated in the first action).
17

Defendants have failed to meet their burden of demonstrating
an abuse of discretion by the circuit court in either instance.
Defendants' filing of the appeal has required plaintiff to incur
further fees in supporting its position.

The Court should affirm

the decision of the circuit court entering judgment in favor of
defendant, and the decision denying defendants' motions to set
aside the judgment, and should award costs and fees to plaintiff.
Respectfully submitted this

j u

day of April, 1995.

WINDER & HASLAM, P.C.

JENNIFER *C. FALK
t^rneyi for Plaintiff/Appellee
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 23 Am. Jur. 2d Depositions
and Discovery §§ 314 to 325.
C.J.S. — 27 C.J.S. Discovery §§ 88 to 110.
A.L.R. — Continuance sought to secure testimony of absent witness in civil case, admissions to prevent, 15 A.L.R.3d 1272.
Party's duty, under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 36(a) and similar state statutes and
rules, to respond to request for admission of

facts not within his personal knowledge, 20
A.L.R.3d 756.
Formal sufficiency of response to request for
admissions under state discovery rules, 8
A.L.R.4th 728.
Permissible scope, respecting nature of mquiry, of demand for admissions under modern
state civil rules of procedure, 42 A.L.R.4th 489.
Key Numbers. — Discovery «=> 121 to 129.

Rule 37, Failure to make or cooperate in discovery; sanctions.
(a) Motion for order compelling discovery. A party, upon reasonable
notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby, may apply for an order
compelling discovery as follows:
(1) Appropriate court. An application for an order to a party may be
made to the court in which the action is pending, or, on matters relating
to a deposition, to the court in the district where the deposition is being
taken. An application for an order to a deponent who is not a party shall
be made to the court in the district where the deposition is being taken.
(2) Motion. If a deponent fails to answer a question propounded or
submitted under Rule 30 or 31, or a corporation or other entity fails to
make a designation under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a), or a party fails to answer
an interrogatory submitted under Rule 33, or if a party, in response to a
request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, fails to respond that
inspection will be permitted as requested or fails to permit inspection as
requested, the discovering party may move for an order compelling an
answer, or a designation, or an order compelling inspection in accordance
with the request. When taking a deposition on oral examination, the
proponent of the question may complete or adjourn the examination before he applies for an order.
If the court denies the motion in whole or in part, it may make such
protective order as it would have been empowered to make on a motion
made pursuant to Rule 26(c).
(3) Evasive or incomplete answer. For purposes of this subdivision
an evasive or incomplete answer is to be treated as a failure to answer.
(4) Award of expenses of motion. If the motion is granted, the court
shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the party or deponent whose
conduct necessitated the motion or the party or attorney advising such
conduct or both of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney fees, unless the
court finds that the opposition to the motion was substantially justified or
that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
If the motion is denied, the court shall, after opportunity for hearing,
require the moving party or the attorney advising the motion or both of
them to pay to the party or deponent who opposed the motion the reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including attorney fees,
unless the court finds that the making of the motion was substantially
justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court may
apportion the reasonable expenses incurred in relation to the motion
among the parties and persons in a just manner.
(b) Failure to comply with order.
(1) Sanctions by court in district where deposition is taken. If a
deponent fails to be sworn or to answer a question after being directed to
do so by the court in the district in which the deposition is being taken,
the failure may be considered a contempt of that court.
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(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If a party or an
officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated
under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an
order to provide or permit discovery, including an order made under Subdivision (a) of this rule or Rule 35, or if a party fails to obey an order
entered under Rule 26(f), the court in which the action is pending may
make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others
the following:
(A) an order that the matters regarding which the order was made
or any other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the
purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order;
(B) an order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or
oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing designated matters in evidence;
(C) an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, dismissing the action or
proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default
against the disobedient party;
(D) in lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an
order treating as a contempt of court the failure to obey any orders
except an order to submit to a physical or mental examination;
(E) where a party has failed to comply with an order under Rule
35(a) requiring him to produce another for examination, such orders
as are listed in Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of this subdivision, unless
the party failing to comply shows that he is unable to produce such
person for examination.
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, the court
shall require the party failing to obey the order or the attorney advising
him or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees,
caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses
unjust.
(c) Expenses on failure to admit. If a party fails to admit the genuineness
of any document or the truth of any matter as requested under Rule 36, and if
the party requesting the admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of the
document or the truth of the matter, he may apply to the court for an order
requiring the other party to pay him the reasonable expenses incurred in
making that proof, including reasonable attorney's fees. The court shall make
the order unless it finds that (1) the request was held objectionable pursuant
to Rule 36(a), or (2) the admission sought was of no substantial importance, or
(3) the party failing to admit had reasonable ground to believe that he might
prevail on the matter, or (4) there was other good reason for the failure to
admit.
(d) Failure of party to attend at own deposition or serve answers to
interrogatories or respond to request for inspection. If a party or an
officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under
Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails (1) to appear before
the officer who is to take his deposition, after being served with a proper
notice, or (2) to serve answers or objections to interrogatories submitted under
Rule 33, after proper service of the interrogatories, or (3) to serve a written
response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, after proper
service of the request, the court in which the action is pending on motion may
make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others it may
take any action authorized under Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of Subdivision
(b)(2) of this rule. In lieu of any order or in addition thereto, the court shall
require the party failing to act or the attorney advising him or both to pay the
reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless
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1106 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); City Consumer
Serv., Inc. v. Peters, 815 P.2d 234 (Utah 1991);
Cornish Town v. Roller, 817 P.2d 305 (Utah
1991); Town of Manila v. Broadbent Land Co.,
818 P.2d 2 (Utah 1991); Peterson v. Peterson,
818 P.2d 1305 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Quinn v.
Quinn, 830 P.2d 282 (Utah Ct. App. 1992);
King v. Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 832 P.2d
858 (Utah 1992); Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1

Rule 55

(Utah Ct. App. 1992); J.H. ex rel. D.H. v. West
Valley City, 840 P.2d 115 (Utah 1992); Ledfors
v. Emery County Sen. Dist., 849 P.2d 1162
(Utah 1993); Ong Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc. v. 11th
Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447 (Utah 1993); Shaw v.
Layton Constr. Co., 854 P.2d 1033 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993); Brumley v. Utah State Tax
Comm'n, 230 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 (Utah 1994).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — Multiple
Claims Under Rule 54(b): A Time for Reexamination?, 1985 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 327.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and
Error § 1009 et seq.; 20 Am. Jur. 2d Costs
§§ 14, 26 to 36, 87 et seq.; 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 1.
C.J.S. — 20 C.J.S. Costs § 1 et seq.; 49
C.J.S. Judgments § 1.
A.L.R. — Attorney's personal liability for
expenses incurred in relation to services for client, 15 A.L.R.3d 531; 66 A.LJEUth 256.
Effect on compensation of architect or building contractor of express provision in private
building contract limiting the cost of the building, 20 A.L.R.3d 778.
Recoverability under property insurance or
insurance against liability for property damage of insured's expenses to prevent or mitigate damages, 33 A.L.R.3d 1262.
Dismissal of plaintiffs action as entitling defendant to recover attorney's fees or costs as
"prevailing party" or "successful party," 66
A.L.R.3d 1087.
Who is the "successful party" or "prevailing
party" for purposes of awarding costs where
both parties prevail on affirmative claims, 66
A.L.R.3d 1115.
Continuance of civil case as conditioned
upon applicant's payment of costs or expenses
incurred by other party, 9 A.L.R.4th 1144.

Running of interest on judgment where both
parties appeal, 11 A.L.R.4th 1099.
Allocation of defense costs between primary
and excess insurance carriers, 19 A.L.R.4th
107.
Authority of trial judge to impose costs or
other sanctions against attorney who fails to
appear at, or proceed with, scheduled trial, 29
A.L.R.4th 160.
Allowance of attorneys' fees in mandamus
proceedings, 34 A.L.R.4th 457.
Retrospective application and effect of state
statute or rule allowing interest or changing
rate of interest on judgments or verdicts, 41
A.L.R.4th 694.
Obduracy as basis for state-court award of
attorneys' fees, 49 A.L.R.4th 825.
Modern status of state court rules governing
entry of judgment on multiple claims, 80
A.L.R.4th 707.
Recoverability of cost of computerized legal
research under 28 USC § 1920 or Rule 54(d),
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 80 A.L.R.
Fed. 168.
Modern status of Federal Civil Procedure
Rule 54(b) governing entry of judgment on
multiple claims, 89 A.L.R. Fed. 514.
Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error «=» 24 to
135; Costs «= 78 et seq., 195 et seq., 221 et seq.;
Judgment «=» 1.

Rule 55. Default.
(a) Default.
(1) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative
relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by
these rules and that fact is made to appear the clerk shall enter his
default.
(2) Notice to party in default. After the entry of the default of any
party, as provided in Subdivision (a)(1) of this rule, it shall not be necessary to give such party in default any notice of action taken or to be taken
or to serve any notice or paper otherwise required by these rules to be
served on a party to the action or proceeding, except as provided in Rule
5(a), in Rule 58A(d) or in the event that it is necessary for the court to
conduct a hearing with regard to the amount of damages of the
nondefaulting party.
(b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be entered as follows:
(1) By the clerk. When the plaintiffs claim against a defendant is for
a sum certain or for a sum which can by computation be made certain,
and the defendant has been personally served otherwise than by publication or by personal service outside of this state, the clerk upon request of
the plaintiff shall enter judgment for the amount due and costs against
the defendant, if he has been defaulted for failure to appear and if he is
not an infant or incompetent person.
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(2) By the court In all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by
default shall apply to the court therefor. If, in order to enable the court to
enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account
or to determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of any
averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter,
the court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it deems
necessary and proper.
(c) Setting aside default. For good cause shown the court may set aside an
entry of default and, if a judgment by default has been entered, may likewise
set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b).
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claimants. The provisions of this
rule apply whether the party entitled to the judgment by default is a plaintiff,
a third-party plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded a cross-claim or counterclaim. In all cases a judgment by default is subject to the limitations of Rule
54(c).
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or agency thereof. No judgment by default shall be entered against the state of Utah or against an officer
or agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief
by evidence satisfactory to the court.
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985.)
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 55, F.R.C.P.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Damages.
Divorce action.
Failure to plead.
Judgment.
—Conduct of counsel.
—Default entry necessary.
—Failure to follow rule.
—Hearing on merits.
—Punitive damages.
Notice.
Setting aside default.
—Collateral attack.
—Direct attack.
—Discretion of court.
—Grounds.
Excusable neglect.
—Judicial attitude.
—Movant's duty.
—Setting aside proper.
Time for appeal.
Cited.
Damages.
A default judgment establishes, as a matter
of law, that defendants are liable to plaintiff as
to each cause of action alleged in the complaint. Nevertheless, it is still incumbent upon
the nondefaulting party to establish by competent evidence the amount of recoverable damages and costs he claims. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah Ct. App.
1989).
There is no right to a jury trial on the issue
of damages once default has been entered.
Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Divorce action.
Defendant who failed to file answer in divorce action was not entitled to hearing or notice before entry of default divorce decree even

though 90-day statutory period had not
elapsed. Heath v. Heath, 541 P.2d 1040 (Utah
1975).
Failure to plead.
In an action for modification of the custody
provision in a divorce decree, it was appropriate for the trial court to rule on appellee's petition, absent any responsive pleading, and to
accept the allegations in the petition as true in
resolving the threshold requirement of
whether appellant's circumstances had materially changed; however, it does not follow that
appellee's petition entitled her to relief. A trial
court asked to render a judgment by default
must first conclude that the uncontroverted allegations of an applicant's petition are, on their
face, legally sufficient to establish a valid
claim against the defaulting party. Stevens v.
Collard, 837 P.2d 593 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Judgment.
Judgments by default are not favored by the
courts nor are they in the interest of justice
and fair play. Heathman v. Fabian &
Clendenin, 14 Utah 2d 60,377 P.2d 189 (1962).
—Conduct of counsel.
When defendant's counsel was 27 minutes
late on morning trial was commenced because
he was unable to obtain from the Supreme
Court a writ of prohibition to prevent the holding of the trial on that day due to absence of
defense witnesses, the trial court erred in
granting a default judgment to plaintiff and
refusing to allow defense counsel to participate
in the proceedings or challenge plaintiffs evidence, notwithstanding any ill-advised, irritating or contemptuous conduct from defense
counsel during the action, since the law prefers
that a case be tried on its merits and the parties litigant should not be made to suffer for
the misconduct of their counsel. McKean v.
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Absence of judge from courtroom during trial
of civil case, 25 A.L.R.3d 637.
Juror's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of
acquaintance or relationship with attorney in
case, or with partner or associate of such attorney, as ground for new trial or mistrial, 64
A.L.R.3d 126.
Amendment, after expiration of time for filmg motion for new trial m civil case of motion
made in due time, 69 A.L.R.3d 845.
.. c . .'
,.
,
4. • 1 •
A .,
Authonty of state court to order jury trial in
civil case where jury has been waived or not
demanded by parties, 9 A.L.R.4th 1041.
Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching
verdict, or securing new trial or reversal on
appeal, 38 A.L.R.4th 1170.
Jury trial waiver as binding on later state
civil trial, 48 A.L.R.4th 747.
Court reporter's death or disability prior to

Rule 60

transcribing notes as grounds for reversal or
new trial, 57 A.L.R.4th 1049.
Propriety of limiting to issue of damages
a i 0 ne new trial granted on ground of inadeq u a c y 0 f damages — modern cases, 5 A.L.R.5th
§75
Excessiveness or adequacy of compensatory
damBgeB
f o r p e r s o n a l i n j u r y to or death of seaman ^ ^ ^
u n d e r Joneg Act (46
u s c s
<. ^ o o x
, . .
., .
K
r
Appx. § 688) or doctrine of unseaworthiness —
^
m( ern cases yb A L K
*
'
' ' ***; r 5 4 1 ' _,
Excessiveness or adequacy of awards of dama es f o r
&
Personal injury or death in actions under
Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 USCS
§§ 5 1 e t seq.) — modern cases, 97 A.L.R. Fed.
189.
Key Numbers. — New Trial «=» 13 et seq.,
110, 116.

Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these
rules or by an independent action.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 60, F.R.C.P.

Cross-References. — Fee for filing motion
to set aside judgment, § 21-1-5.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
„.
. A.* .
*. *»
xl
Any other reason justifying relief.
—Default judgment.
—Impossibility of compliance with order.
—Incompetent counsel.
—Lack of due process.
—Merits of case.

—Mistake or inadvertence.
—Mutual mistake.
^ R ^ Ip a r t y i n i n t e r e s t
Appeals.
Clerical mistakes.
—Computation of damages.
—Correction after appeal.
—Date of judgment.
« > r > «r>
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SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
MICHAEL A. MOWER,
TO COMPEL DISCOVERY
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JAMES D. CRAGHEAD, F. LYNN
PADAN aka ASPEN
CONSTRUCTION, INC., MARTIN
BENNETT, JOHN and JANE DO:
NOS. 1 through 20,

Civil No. 930009062 CV
Judge Sheila K. McCleve

Defendants.
Based upon the motion of plaintiff Michael A. Mower, pursuant to Utah R.Civ.P. 37(a) and Utah Code Jud. Admin. 4-502, for
an Order compelling defendants to respond to the Plaintiff's
First Set of Interrogatories to Defendants James D. Craghead and
F. Lynn Padan and Plaintiff's First Request for Production of
Documents to Defendants James D. Craghead and F. Lynn Padan, and
good cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants James D. Craghead and F. Lynn Padan have ten days within
which to answer the said discovery requests.

The Court further

ORDERS that plaintiff may be awarded his costs and attorney's
fees incurred in connection with this Motion to Compel.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above
and foregoing ORDER TO COMPEL DISCOVERY was mailed, postage
prepaid, via U.S. Mail, this 1^

day of May, 1994, to:

Attorneys for Defendants Craahead and Padan:
Joseph M. Chambers
PRESTON & CHAMBERS
31 Federal Avenue
Logan, Utah 84321
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LINCOLN W. HOBBS, Esq. #4846
JENNIFER L. FALK, Esq. #4568
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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175 West 200 South #4000
P. O. Box 2668

Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668
Telephone: (801) 322-2222
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
MICHAEL A. MOWER,
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
COMPEL DISCOVERY

Plaintiff,
vs.
JAMES D. CRAGHEAD, F. LYNN
PADAN aka ASPEN
CONSTRUCTION, INC., MARTIN
BENNETT, JOHN and JANE DOES
NOS. 1 through 20,

Civil No. 930009062 CV
Judge Sheila K. McCleve

Defendants.
Plaintiff, by and through his counsel of record, hereby
respectfully submits this Memorandum in Support of his Motion to
Compel Discovery.
FACTS
On March 28, 1994, plaintiff submitted to defendants the
Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents.

A true and correct copy of plaintiff's dis-

covery requests and the corresponding service are attached hereto
as Exhibit "A".
The defendant's responses were due on April 28, 1994, however, defendants failed to respond by that date.

On May 10, 1994,
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counsel for plaintiff sent the letter to defendants' counsel
requesting the discovery responses. A true and correct copy of
this letter is attached hereto as Exhibit "B". No responses to
the letter or the discovery have been received.
Plaintiff has received no response to his discovery requests
despite the aforementioned letter.
ARGUMENT
Rule 37 of the Utah R. Civ. P. provides that a party may
apply for an order compelling discovery if a party fails to
answer interrogatories submitted under Rule 33 or allow inspection pursuant to a request made under Rule 34.
Furthermore, Rule 37(d) provides that if a party fails to
serve answers or objections to interrogatories submitted under
Rule 33, the court may make such orders as are just. Under Rule
37(d) the court may order the party failing to respond to
interrogatories or the attorney advising the party, or both, to
pay reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the
failure.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, plaintiff respectfully requests the
Court to enter an order requiring defendants to respond to
plaintiff's discovery requests.

Plaintiff also requests the

Court to award reasonable costs and attorney's fees incurred by
plaintiff in bringing this Motion to Compel.
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DATED this

j

T~

day of May, 1994.
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C.

LINCOLN W. HdBBS ^
JENNIFER L. \FALK
Attorneys, fo^ Plaintiff
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above
and foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
COMPEL DISCOVERY was mailed, postage prepaid, via U.S. Mail, this
1T

day of May, 1994, to:
Attorneys for Defendants Craahead and Padan;
Joseph M. Chambers
PRESTON & CHAMBERS
31 Federal Avenue
Logan, Utah 84321
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- 3 -

Bcrio

THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
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LINCOLN W. HOBBS, Esq. #4846
JENNIFER L. FALK, Esq. #4568
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
175 West 200 South #4000
P. O. Box 2668
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668
Telephone: (801) 322-2222
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
MICHAEL A. MOWER,
Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING ATTORNEY'S
FEES

vs.
JAMES D. CRAGHEAD, F. LYNN
PADAN aka ASPEN
CONSTRUCTION, INC., MARTIN
BENNETT, JOHN and JANE DOES
NOS. 1 through 20,

Civil No. 930009062 CV
Judge Sheila K. McCleve

Defendants.
On July 7, 1994, plaintiff Michael Mower filed a Motion to
Compel and For Sanctions, along with supporting memorandum,
seeking to compel responses to certain interrogatories and for
documents pursuant to discovery served by mail on defendants on
March 28, 1994, and a Motion to Compel filed on May 18, 1994.
On July 22, 1994, plaintiff filed a Notice to Submit for
Decision.

There being no responsive pleading filed by defendants

and the time for filing such responses having now run,
The Court, having reviewed the file, and for good cause
appearing, enters the following ORDER:
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Plaintiff's Motion to Compel is granted.

Defendants are to

provide their response to plaintiff's discovery within 20 days or
defendants' answer will be deemed stricken and judgment entered.
Plaintiff is awarded

attorneys fees, against defendants

for failure to provide requested discoveryIT IS SO ORDERED
DATED this
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above
and foregoing ORDER GRANTING ATTORNEY'S FEES was mailed, postage
prepaid, via U.S. Mail, this

cb^

day of August, 1994, to:

Attorneys for Defendants Craahead and Padan:
Joseph M. Chambers
PRESTON & CHAMBERS
31 Federal Avenue
Logan, Utah 84321
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LINCOLN W. HOBBS, E s q . # 4 8 4 6
JENNIFER L. FALK, E s q . # 4 5 6 8
WINDER & HASLAM, P . C .
Attorneys for Plaintiff
175 West 200 S o u t h #4000
P . O. Box 2 6 6 8
S a l t Lake C i t y , U t a h
84110-2668
Telephone: (801) 322-2222
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
MICHAEL A. MOWER,
Plaintiff,

:
:

vs.

:

JAMES D. CRAGHEAD, F. LYNN
PADAN aka ASPEN
CONSTRUCTION, INC., MARTIN
BENNETT, JOHN and JANE DOES
NOS. 1 through 20,

:
:
:

Defendants.

DEFAULT CERTIFICATE

Civil No. 930009062 CV
Judge Sheila K. McCleve

:
:

In this action, the defendants, James D. Craghead and F.
Lynn Padan aka Aspen Construction, Inc., having been regularly
served with process, and having failed to appear and answer
plaintiff's discovery requests on file herein, and the time
allowed by law for answering having expired, the default of said
defendants, James D. Craghead and F. Lynn Padan aka Aspen Construction, Inc., in the premises is hereby duly entered according
to law.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above
and foregoing DEFAULT CERTIFICATE was mailed, postage prepaid,
via U.S. Mail, this

11

day of August, 1994, to:

Attorneys for Defendants Craahead and Padan;
Joseph M. Chambers
PRESTON & CHAMBERS
31 Federal Avenue
Logan, Utah 84321
Courtesy copy hand delivered to:
Honorable Sheila K. McCleve
Circuit Court Judge
451 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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FILED
LINCOLN W. HOBBS, Esq. #4846
JENNIFER L. FALK, Esq. #4568
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
175 West 200 South #4000
P. O. Box 2668
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668
Telephone: (801) 322-2222

AUG 2 5 1994
Third Cirptrft Court
Salt Lak^Department

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
MICHAEL A. MOWER,
Plaintiff,

UDGMENT

vs.
JAMES D. CRAGHEAD, F. LYNN
PADAN aka ASPEN
CONSTRUCTION, INC., MART]
BENNETT, JOHN and JANE DOES
NOS. 1 through 20,

Civil No. 930009062 CV
Judge Sheila K. McCleve

Defendants.
On July 27, 1994, the Court ruled in plaintiff's favor,
granting plaintiff's Motion to Compel and for Sanctions, granting
plaintiff's request for attorney's fees.

In so ruling, the Court

ordered defendants to produce the requested discovery by no later
than 20 days from the date of the Court's ruling, or judgment
would be entered in favor of plaintiff.
The defendants having failed to comply with the previous
order of the Court, and based on the pleadings on file, and for
good cause appearing, the Court enters Judgment against defendants and in favor of plaintiff as follows:

B0017

1.

The principal amount of $13,515.58, plus prejudgment

interest from August 16, 1992.
2.

Dismissing defendants1 Counterclaim herein.

3.

Attorney's fees in the amount of $4,041.00 determined

by the Court based on submission of Affidavit by plaintiff's
counsel.
4.

Plaintiff's costs incurred herein in the amount of

$594.35.
5.

Entry of Judgment on plaintiff's cause of action for

foreclosure will be stayed.
6.

It is further ordered, pursuant to Rule 4-505 Code of

Judicial Administration that this Judgment shall be augmented in
the amount of reasonable costs and attorney's fees expended in
collecing said Judgment by execution or otherwise as shall be
established by affidavit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED t h i s

%1

day o f

%s

fit///kt/iyv

. 1994.

CIRCUIT ^bXlRI^'JUDGE* J

^09un cox

-

2 -

P.G318

CERTIFICATE OP SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above
and foregoing JUDGMENT as mailed, postage prepaid, via U.S. Mail,
this

jW

day of August, 1994, to:

Attorneys for Defendants Craahead and Padan:
Joseph M. Chambers
PRESTON & CHAMBERS
31 Federal Avenue
Logan, Utah 84321
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THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
DISPOSITION SUMMARY
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LINCOLN W. HOBBS, Esq. #4846
JENNIFER L. FALK, Esq. #4568
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
175 West 200 South #4000
P. O. Box 2668
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668
Telephone: (801) 322-2222
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
MICHAEL A. MOWER,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
vs.
JAMES D. CRAGHEAD, F. LYNN
PADAN aka ASPEN
CONSTRUCTION, INC., MARTIN
BENNETT, JOHN and JANE DOES
NOS. 1 through 20,

Civil No. 930009062 CV
Judge Sheila K. McCleve

Defendants.
On July 17, 1994, the Court granted plaintiff's Motion to
Compel and for Attorney's Fees and on August 4, 1994, entered an
Order reflecting its earlier ruling.
On August 24, 1994, the Court entered default judgment in
favor of plaintiff against defendants awarding plaintiff the
principal amount due, plus costs and fees for a total judgment of
$18,150.93.

Defendants filed an "Objection to Proposed Order

(Default Judgment), Motion to Stay Entry of Default Judgment and
in the Alternative Motion for Relief from Order and/or for a New
Trial," along with supporting memorandum and affidavits on August

J?C/
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31, 1994, to which plaintiff filed a Response, defendants filed a
Reply, and plaintiff filed a Supplemental Response.
The Court, having reviewed the record and the pleadings
filed herein, and for good cause appearing, affirms its ruling of
September 14, 1994 and DENIES defendants' Objection to Proposed
Order (Default Judgment), Motion to Stay Entry of Judgment, and
in the Alternative Motion for Relief from Order and/or for a New
Trial.
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CERTIFICATE OP SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above
and foregoing ORDER was mailed, postage prepaid, via U.S. Mail,
this

/ 9 - day of September, 1994, to:
Attorneys for Defendants Craahead and Padan:
Joseph M. Chambers
PRESTON & CHAMBERS
31 Federal Avenue
Logan, Utah 84321
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WINDER & HASLAM
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
175 WEST 200 SOUTH
P.O. BOX 2668
SALT IAKE CTTY, UTAH 84110-2668
FAX(801) 5323706
(801) 322-2222

August 4,

JENNIFER L FALK

1994

Joseph M. Chambers
PRESTON & CHAMBERS

VIA FACSIMILE #752-3556

31 Federal Avenue
Logan, Utah 84321
Re:

Michael Mower v. James P. Craghead, et al

Dear Joe:
I have a phone message dated August 4, 1994, at 9:33 a.m.
regarding "Lynn Padan's business burglarized-July 13th" and
was further informed that you wanted me to know as to the
reason we had not received responses to our discovery requests- However, our discovery was originally sent on March
28, 1994. Responses were due 30 days later and, even giving
grace time for mailing, should have been filed the first of
May,
When we did receive responses, they were incomplete and we
filed a Motion to Compel on July 6, 1994, after a letter dated
June 21 and phone calls to you requesting that the responses
be supplemented. No documents have been produced. A copy of
my June 21 letter is enclosed. You have not explained how the
alleged burglary of Mr. Padan's business on July 13 affects
your ability to respond; unless you are alleging a burglar
stole all of the documents we requested. Even so, you still
have not responded to certain of our interrogatory requests.
Nor do I see how the burglary would affect Cragheadfs ability
to respond.
As you know, our Motion for Sanctions was granted July 27,
199 4 and you have twenty days from that date in which to fully
respond to the discovery requests or judgment will be granted.
We expect the answers to our interrogatories, along with all
documents you do have in your possession by no later than
August 17, 1994, the date designed by the Court. In addition,
please send a list of those documents you allege you cannot
deliver us due to the burglary.

Sincerely,

XjJkJENNIFER It. FALK
,JLF:lbp
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